Research

Optimal Entry Coordination in Auctions with Entry Cost (Work in Progress, about 50%)
  • First Draft

    • This paper presents a framework for coordinating agents into a non-exclusive auction with bidding costs. Agents possess private values, yet a cost is incurred to both obtain this information and to participate in the auction. The entry strategy in a symmetric mixed equilibrium is, in general, inefficient and suboptimal. By applying the revelation principle, the optimal communication strategy is identified. The auctioneer can ensure trade occurs, earn higher revenue, and improve efficiency with the optimal recommendation. For any finite number of agents, the optimal recommendation structure is solely dependent on the cost, with only two possible numbers of entrants appearing in the auction. The optimal recommendation structure is ex-ante efficient.

    The International Politics of Debris in Earth's Orbit: A Mechanism Design Approach (with C.-Philipp Heller, Work in Progress)

    Abstract will come soon.

    When to Hire an Advertiser? (with Yushan Meng, Work in Progress)

    Abstract will come soon.

    Reputational Intermediary (with Mingzhao Dai, Yifei Dai and Yushan Meng, Work in Progress)

    Abstract will come soon.