Research

Optimal Entry Coordination in Auctions with Entry Cost (Work in Progress, about 50%)
  • First Draft
  • This paper presents a framework for coordinating agents into an non-exclusive auction with bidding costs. Agents possess private values, yet a cost is incurred to both obtain this information and to participate in the auction. The entry strategy in a symmetric mixed equilibrium is, in general, inefficient and suboptimal. By applying the revelation principle, the optimal communication strategy is identified. The auctioneer can ensure trade occurs, earn higher revenue, and improve efficiency with the optimal recommendation. For any finite number of agents, the optimal recommendation structure is solely dependent on the cost, with only two possible numbers of entrants appearing in the auction. The optimal recommendation structure is ex-ante efficient.

    Optimal Reporting with an Informed Reviewer (with Yushan Meng, Work in Progress)

    Abstract will come soon.

    Digital Reviewers and Naive Viewers: A Reputational Effect (with Yifei Dai and Yushan Meng, Work in Progress)

    Abstract will come soon.

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