Entry Coordination in Auctions with Entry Costs
Private entry recommendations let the seller capture all surplus net of entry costs by randomizing between the efficient entrant count and one more.
Profile
Jia Wei Zhang
Zhāng Jiāwéi
Zoeng1 Gaa1 Wai4
Postdoc • MSM • UDE
Duisburg, Germany
Auctions, information economics, market design, and mechanism design.
Updates
- Sep. 2026 — New draft: “Performance Contracts for Noncontractible Recommendations”
- Sep. 2026 — New draft: “Evidence Rules and the Value of Silence”
- Aug. 2026 — New draft: "Entry Coordination in Auctions with Entry Costs"
Papers
Research
Performance Contracts for Noncontractible Recommendations
With private advice costs, at most two performance contracts attain the seller’s best delegated payoff under favorable equilibrium selection; direct commitment weakly improves that payoff.
Evidence Rules and the Value of Silence
Strict evidence requirements can induce more investigation yet worsen decisions because the extra evidence fails to compensate for ignoring informative silence.
About
Short bio
I am a postdoc at the Mercator School of Management, University of Duisburg-Essen.
I expect to get my PhD in 2026 at the Berlin School of Economics (BSoE), Humboldt University of Berlin, supervised by Prof. Roland Strausz and Prof. Sebastian Schweighofer-Kodritsch. My research interests are auctions, information economics, market design, and mechanism design.