Entry Coordination in Auctions with Entry Costs
Private entry recommendations let the seller capture all surplus net of entry costs by randomizing between the efficient entrant count and one more.
Profile
Jia Wei Zhang
Zhāng Jiāwéi
Zoeng1 Gaa1 Wai4
PhD Candidate • BSoE • HU Berlin
Berlin, Germany
Auctions, information economics, market design, and mechanism design.
Updates
- Aug. 2026 — New draft: “Default Rules and Whistleblowing with Covert Evidence Acquisition”
- Aug. 2026 — New draft: “Higher Verification Costs Can Support More Disclosure”
- Aug. 2026 — New draft: "Entry Coordination in Auctions with Entry Costs"
Papers
Research
When to Hire an Influencer?
A paid influencer is profitable only when effort costs are low and the share of inexperienced consumers is positive but not too large.
Higher Verification Costs Can Support More Disclosure
Higher verification costs can increase favorable disclosure because harsher inferences from silence induce the sender to verify more often.
About
Short bio
I am a PhD candidate at the Berlin School of Economics (BSoE), Humboldt University of Berlin, supervised by Prof. Roland Strausz and Prof. Sebastian Schweighofer-Kodritsch. My research interests are auctions, information economics, market design, and mechanism design.
In September 2026, I will join Mercator School of Management, University of Duisburg-Essen as a postdoc.