Entry Coordination in Auctions with Entry Costs
Jia Wei Zhang · Working paper · Revision requested by Games and Economic Behavior.
Private entry recommendations let the seller capture all surplus net of entry costs by randomizing between the efficient entrant count and one more.
When to Hire an Influencer?
A paid influencer is profitable only when effort costs are low and the share of inexperienced consumers is positive but not too large.
The International Politics of Debris in Earth’s Orbit: A Mechanism Design Approach
Without credible enforcement, free-riding reduces debris agreements to the anarchic outcome; conditioning orbital access on participation can support more efficient cooperation.
Default Rules and Whistleblowing with Covert Evidence Acquisition
Jia Wei Zhang · Working paper
Under covert verification, deny-by-default improves receiver welfare only by inducing more testing, while whistleblowing matters only with voluntary certification.
Higher Verification Costs Can Support More Disclosure
Jia Wei Zhang · Working paper
Higher verification costs can increase favorable disclosure because harsher inferences from silence induce the sender to verify more often.
Persuade Before Evidence
Early public persuasion can crowd out hard-evidence acquisition and leave the receiver less informed, so restricting pre-trial publicity may improve welfare.
Rewarding Bad News: Optimal Evidence Rules with Covert Verification
Jia Wei Zhang · Draft in preparation